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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
NORMA LOIS COOPER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs 
FORESTERS UNDER-
WRITERS, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S 
REPLY 
BRIEF 
Case No. 7941 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent has included in her Statement of 
Facts what purports to be a Stipulation contained 
in the record which came up from the City Court. 
No formal Stipulation was entered into in the City 
Court. After a discussion in a pretrial hearing 
before Judge J. Patton Neeley, a written memor-
andum was filed by each of the parties, which con-
tained his version of the facts. The quotation on 
Pages 2 and 3 of Respondent's Brief is taken from 
a draft of a proposed Stipulation prepared by Re-
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spondent, but which was never executed or agreed 
to by Appellant. The so-called "fuller Statement of 
Facts" referred to by Respondent was not agreed to 
at the time this matter was before the District Court, 
is not a part of the record on appeal and can not 
be considered by this Court on this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I 
THE QUESTION OF WAIVER IS NOT BE-
FORE THE COURT. 
II 
THE RIGHT OF FORFEITURE WAS NOT 
WAIVED. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE QUESTION OF WAIVER IS NOT BE-
FORE THE COURT. 
Respondent has tried to enlarge on the facts 
in an attempt to have this Court consider the ques-
tion of waiver. As stated heretofore, the "fuller 
Statement of Facts" of Respondent is not a part of 
the record ~nd not before the Court. There is 
nothing whatever in the record which is before the 
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Court which goes to the question of waiver. This 
case should be decided on the issues raised in Ap-
pellant's Brief. 
II 
THE RIGHT OF FORFEITURE WAS NOT 
WAIVED. 
Notwithstanding Appellant's contention that 
the record excludes a consideration of the question 
of waiver, should this Court for any reason do so, 
then Appellant maintains there was no waiver either 
in fact or law. 
The circumstances relied upon by Respondent 
to establish waiver are: The first premium was paid 
in the afternoon of March 31, 1951, and coverage 
started at noon of that day; that the payments on 
October 1, 1951, and October 31, 1951, were ac-
cepted unconditionally; that the payments on Oct-
ober 1, 1951, and October 31, 1951, were made in 
the afternoon of those days,· after the grace period 
had expired; that Appellant never tendered back to 
Respondent any premiums. No waiver exists by 
reason of such circumstances. 
The policy became effective on March 31, 1951, 
at noon. That the premium was paid and the policy 
issued later that day is of no consequence. Had the 
policy been dated the following day Respondent 
woud not have been covered by insurance until Noon 
of the following day. Undoubtedly it was to the 
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advantage of Respondent to have immediate cover-
age and that i'S why the policy was dated on the date 
of the payment of the premium. No inference 
arises from this incident that a pattern of accepting 
premiums late was established. 
Respondent contends the premium on October 
1, 1951, was paid in the afternoon of said day. 
There is nothing even in Respondent's so-called 
"fuller Statement of Facts" which specifies the time 
of day when the premium was paid. Whether paid 
in the forenoon or afternoon, makes no difference. 
If paid in the forenoon Appellant was obligated to 
accept the premium as the grace period had not ex-
pired. If it was paid in the afternoon Appellant had 
the legal right to accept the payment and apply it to 
the Se.ptember coverage. Respondent enjoyed cover-
age during the month of September, which Appellant 
was entitled to be compensated for. The authorities 
hold that even in the event of forfeiture the insured 
is not relieved of the obligation to pay for the period 
the policy is in force. 44 C. J. S. 1331, Mass. 
Union Mut. Casualty Ins. Corporation, v. Insurance 
Budget Plan, 195 N. E. 903, 291 Mass. 62, 98 A. L. 
R. 1422. Mo.-General Service Corporation vs. All-
hoff Bros., App., 139 S. W. 2d 1062. Neb.-Bleicher 
v. Heeter 4 N. W. 2d 897, 141 Neb. 787. N. Y. 
Great American Indemnity Co., v. Greenberg Bros. 
Iron & Steel Corporation, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 656, 170 
Misc. 489-Commercial Casualty Co. v. Rice, 157 
N. Y. S. 1, 93 Misc. 567. 
The payment of $12.00 on October 31, 1951, 
was made in the afternoon of said day, but after 
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the accident had occurred. Appellant applied $6.00 
of that amount to the October coverage and the re-
maining $6.00 was used to reinstate the policy. 
However, the policy could be reinstated only accord-
ing to its terms: 
"REINSTATEMENT. The right of the in-: 
sured to have the policy reinstated after de~ 
fault in the payment of a premium, and his 
rights under the policy as reinstated, .are de-
termined by the provisions of the policy." 45 
C. J. S. Page 558. 
The only limitation on reinstatement was that 
it covered accidental injury thereafter sustained. 
(Italics ours.) 
The policy does not require a new application 
or evidence of insurability in order to effect a rein--
statement. No reason existed to alter the ·date of 
coverage if reinstatement occurred on the last day 
of the month which had always been the date deter-
mining monthly coverage. The policy having been 
reinstated there was no occasion to tender ·back any 
premiums to Respondent. 
The cases cited by Respondent are not in point 
and have no application to the case at bar. 
In Ellerbeck, vs. Continental Casualty Com-
pany, 63 Utah 530, 227 Pac. 850, the insurance com-
pany had forwarded statements to the insured de-
manding payment of the annual premium. There 
had been a conversation between a representative 
of the insurance company and the insured wherein 
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a credit arrangement had been granted by the com-
pany to the insured and the company had accepted 
a partial payment of the premium for the period 
in question. 
In Loftis, vs. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance 
Company, 38 Utah 532, 114 Pac. 134, arrange-
ments had been made with the employer of the in-
sured to deduct premiums from his wages. The 
insurance company submitted a list to the employer 
containing the names of policy holders and the 
amount of premiums owing for the months involved. 
It was made to appear that the insurance company 
kllew other employees who had not earned sufficient 
wages each month to pay insurance premiums 
promptly when due. Several instances of default 
of payment had occurred, which the insurance com-
pany had disregarded. The company had demanded 
and received payment of premium and treated them 
as though they had been timely paid. 
In Vinther, vs. Sunset Mutual Life Insurance 
Company, 53 Pac. 182 (Cal.) it was made to appear 
that ten payments had been made late and accepted 
by the company, one of which was as much as 38 
days late. 
In Sullivan, vs. Beneficial Life Insurance Com-
pany, 91 Utah 405, 64 Pac. 2d 351, the wife of the 
insured was told before the expiration of the grace 
period by a representative of the company that 
"When Mr. Sullivan sends the money to you, bring 
it in." She was also told it would be all right to bring 
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it in after the grace period expired, and was also 
advised that in case the money does not arrive for 
some time she could take an application for rein-
statement form and have Mr. Sullivan fill it out and 
bring it in when he returned home. 
In Watkins, vs. Brotherhood of American Yoe-
men (Mo.) 176 S. W. 516, it was made to appear 
that it was the practice of the company to permit 
payments to be made after the due date in 80% to 
90% of the cases and in such instances to reinstate 
the policy. 
In Bonnot, vs. Grand Lodge Brotherhood ~f 
R. R. Trainmen (Mo.) 81 S. W. 2d 360, the Court 
found the company had waived a forfeiture where 
it was shown the Treasurer of its local lodges had 
been permitted to accept premiums late. 
In Knarston, vs. Manhattan Life Insuran·ee 
Company (Cal.) 56 Pac. 773, it was made to appear 
that a general agent had granted a ten day ex· 
tention and had attempted to collect the premium 
on two occasions after the ten days had elapsed and 
the general agent had testified that he would have 
accepted the premium had it been tendered to him 
on the date of the death of the insured. 
In Huber, vs. New York Life Insurance Com-
pany (Cal.) 63 Pac. 2d 318, it was held that the 
company was estopped under the circumstances to 
deny that an agent to whom payment had been made 
within the time allowed by the policy had authority 
to collect the premium. 
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The test of waiver is stated by this Court in 
Ballard, vs. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 82 
Utah 1, 21 Pac. 2d 847, as follows: 
"Insurance company which, by any course of 
conduct, induces in mind of insured honest be-
lief, reasonably founded, that strict compliance 
with stipulation for prompt payment of pre-
miums will not be insisted on, waives right 
to forfeiture for nonpayment." 
According to this test none of the elements of 
waiver exists in the case at bar. No "course of con-
duct" was "reasonably founded" which could have 
induced in the mind of Respondent an honest belief 
that strict compliance would not be insisted upon. 
There is no question but what all payments prior to 
October 1st had been made within the grace period. 
There is nothing in the record to show that the Oct-
ober 1st payment was not made within the grace 
period. Assuming the October 1st payment to have 
been made in the afternoon of that day such does 
not establish a "course of conduct" upon which 
waiver can be predicated. None of the cases cited by 
Respondent so hold, and such is not the law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY AND BOYER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
1409 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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